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Part of Hardening and Configuration Review5 services in this practice area

Tighten the Edge, Rule by Rule

Firewall and Perimeter Review

We review your firewall rule bases and edge device configurations against vendor hardening guides and CIS Benchmarks. You learn which rules are too broad, which are unused, and how your perimeter really looks from outside.

See the engagement path, 6 phasesSee the full Hardening and Configuration Review service index

Overview

Firewall rule bases grow over time and rarely shrink. Old rules linger, any-any entries creep in, and management interfaces end up reachable from places they should not be. This review parses your firewall and edge configurations, checks them against vendor hardening guides and CIS Benchmarks, and pairs that with external checks of what your perimeter actually exposes. You get a clean picture of risky and redundant rules, plus a plan to tighten them safely.

Methodology

How the Engagement Runs

Every phase has a named output, so you always know what is being worked on and what lands on your side of the table.

The Engagement, End to End

6 Phases, 6 Named Handovers

Flow

Flow chart of the Firewall and Perimeter Review engagement, 6 phases in order, each one selectable. Phase 1, Scoping and Baseline Selection. We list the firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge devices in scope and pick the matching CIS or vendor hardening baseline for each platform. Activities: Inventory firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge routers; Record platform, firmware version and management method; Select the CIS or vendor hardening guide per platform; Agree the external IP ranges we may probe. Hands over Device Inventory and Baseline Selection. Phase 2, Evidence and Config Collection. We collect device configurations and rule-base exports as read-only evidence, along with any network diagrams and change records you have. Activities: Collect running configurations and rule-base exports; Gather network diagrams and VLAN or zone definitions; Pull recent firewall change records and approvals; Request hit counts on rules where the platform records them. Hands over Configuration and Rule-Base Evidence Pack. Phase 3, Benchmark Comparison. We analyse configurations with Nipper and config parsers, mapping device hardening settings to CIS and vendor guides. Activities: Run Nipper against each device configuration; Parse rule bases for any-any and overly wide objects; Map device hardening settings to CIS and vendor guidance; Check management plane, SNMP and logging configuration. Hands over Device Hardening Scorecard. Phase 4, Manual Review of Risky Settings. We hand-review the rule base for overly broad, shadowed and unused rules, exposed management planes, and weak VPN and TLS settings that automated tools rank poorly. Activities: Identify shadowed, duplicated and zero-hit rules; Trace which rules permit inbound access to internal zones; Test segmentation between VLANs and trust zones; Review VPN authentication, split tunnelling and cipher settings; Check TLS on management interfaces with testssl.sh. Hands over Risky Rule and Setting Analysis. Phase 5, External Exposure Check. Using Nmap and firewalk-style probing we confirm what the perimeter actually presents from the outside, so findings reflect reality rather than intent. Activities: Scan agreed external ranges for reachable TCP and UDP services; Compare live exposure against what the rule base intends; Probe filtering behaviour with firewalk-style techniques; Confirm no management interface answers from the internet. Hands over External Exposure Evidence. Phase 6, Prioritised Findings and Re-Check. We rank findings by exposure, propose a safe rule-cleanup order, and re-review after changes to confirm the perimeter has tightened. Activities: Rank findings by external reachability and reach into the estate; Sequence rule removals from lowest to highest change risk; Draft the tightened rule wording for each change; Re-review the configuration and rescan the perimeter. Hands over Rule-Base Cleanup Plan and Re-Check Report. Each phase begins from the artefact the phase before it produced.

Phase 01 Scoping and Baseline Selection

We list the firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge devices in scope and pick the matching CIS or vendor hardening baseline for each platform.

What Happens In This Phase

  • Inventory firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge routers
  • Record platform, firmware version and management method
  • Select the CIS or vendor hardening guide per platform
  • Agree the external IP ranges we may probe

The Handover

Device Inventory and Baseline Selection

The next phase starts from this.

Read the handover cards on their own and you have the paper trail. Select a phase to see what happens inside it.
  1. 01

    Scoping and Baseline Selection

    We list the firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge devices in scope and pick the matching CIS or vendor hardening baseline for each platform.

    OutputDevice Inventory and Baseline Selection

    Activities

    • Inventory firewalls, VPN concentrators and edge routers
    • Record platform, firmware version and management method
    • Select the CIS or vendor hardening guide per platform
    • Agree the external IP ranges we may probe
  2. 02

    Evidence and Config Collection

    We collect device configurations and rule-base exports as read-only evidence, along with any network diagrams and change records you have.

    OutputConfiguration and Rule-Base Evidence Pack

    Activities

    • Collect running configurations and rule-base exports
    • Gather network diagrams and VLAN or zone definitions
    • Pull recent firewall change records and approvals
    • Request hit counts on rules where the platform records them
  3. 03

    Benchmark Comparison

    We analyse configurations with Nipper and config parsers, mapping device hardening settings to CIS and vendor guides.

    OutputDevice Hardening Scorecard

    Activities

    • Run Nipper against each device configuration
    • Parse rule bases for any-any and overly wide objects
    • Map device hardening settings to CIS and vendor guidance
    • Check management plane, SNMP and logging configuration
  4. 04

    Manual Review of Risky Settings

    We hand-review the rule base for overly broad, shadowed and unused rules, exposed management planes, and weak VPN and TLS settings that automated tools rank poorly.

    OutputRisky Rule and Setting Analysis

    Activities

    • Identify shadowed, duplicated and zero-hit rules
    • Trace which rules permit inbound access to internal zones
    • Test segmentation between VLANs and trust zones
    • Review VPN authentication, split tunnelling and cipher settings
    • Check TLS on management interfaces with testssl.sh
  5. 05

    External Exposure Check

    Using Nmap and firewalk-style probing we confirm what the perimeter actually presents from the outside, so findings reflect reality rather than intent.

    OutputExternal Exposure Evidence

    Activities

    • Scan agreed external ranges for reachable TCP and UDP services
    • Compare live exposure against what the rule base intends
    • Probe filtering behaviour with firewalk-style techniques
    • Confirm no management interface answers from the internet
  6. 06

    Prioritised Findings and Re-Check

    We rank findings by exposure, propose a safe rule-cleanup order, and re-review after changes to confirm the perimeter has tightened.

    OutputRule-Base Cleanup Plan and Re-Check Report

    Activities

    • Rank findings by external reachability and reach into the estate
    • Sequence rule removals from lowest to highest change risk
    • Draft the tightened rule wording for each change
    • Re-review the configuration and rescan the perimeter

Specification

What We Run, and What We Measure You Against

The tooling our engineers use on this work, and the published standards the findings and evidence are mapped to.

Scope

What Is Examined, and What it Is Measured Against

Map

Map of the Firewall and Perimeter Review scope, running left to right in three stages. Stage one, what we run, 8 tools and techniques: Nipper, Nmap, firewalk, firewall config parsers, policy-analysis tooling (AlgoSec-style review), testssl.sh, Wireshark, vendor CLI exports. Stage two, findings from all of it are proven by hand and written up once. Stage three, measured against 7 published standards: CIS Cisco Benchmarks, CIS Palo Alto and Fortinet hardening references, DISA Network Infrastructure STIGs, NIST SP 800-41 (firewall policy), NIST SP 800-53, Vendor hardening guides, MITRE ATT&CK.

What We Run

8 tools

  • Nipper
  • Nmap
  • firewalk
  • firewall config parsers
  • policy-analysis tooling (AlgoSec-style review)
  • testssl.sh
  • Wireshark
  • vendor CLI exports

Converges On

One Set of Proven Findings

Every issue is reproduced by hand before it is written down, and it is written down once.

Measured Against

7 standards

  • CISCisco
  • CISPalo Alto and FortinetHardening
  • DISASTIGsNetwork Infrastructure
  • NIST SP 800-41 (firewall policy)
  • NIST SP 800-53
  • VENDORHardening Guides
  • MITRE ATT&CK
One pass of testing and analysis, one set of findings, then that single set is graded against every standard on the right. You are not paying for the same work once per framework.

Deliverables

What You Receive

  • Firewall and perimeter findings report
  • Rule-base cleanup plan
  • Device hardening scorecard
  • Re-check report after remediation

Scope This Engagement

Tell us about your environment, your timelines and any audit dates you are working to. We come back with scope, effort and a start date.

Questions

What Clients Ask Us

Something here not covered? Ask Us Directly.

What does a firewall rule-base review find that an external vulnerability scan cannot?

A scanner tells you which ports answer; a rule-base review tells you why they answer and what else the same rule permits. Those are different questions. An external scan sees the perimeter from one vantage point at one moment, so it cannot see a rule that is shadowed by an earlier entry and never evaluated, a rule with a zero hit count that nobody dares remove, or an any-any entry that happens to be masked today by a device further down the path. It also cannot see the rules that permit inbound access to internal zones from source ranges far wider than the business case behind them. We parse the exported configurations, trace those paths by hand, and run the external checks as well, because live exposure and documented intent often disagree. The report tells you which of the two is wrong. If you want the exposed services themselves exploited rather than mapped, that is our penetration testing work, not this review.

What do we need to provide, and how much of our team's time does the review take?

Three things: the configurations, the picture of the network they sit in, and the change history behind them. Concretely that means running configurations and rule-base exports from each firewall, VPN concentrator and edge router in scope; network diagrams with VLAN or zone definitions, so a rule permitting traffic into a zone can be judged against what lives there; recent firewall change records and approvals; and rule hit counts where the platform records them, because a hit count is the difference between a rule we suspect is unused and one we can show is unused. We also need the external IP ranges you agree we may probe. Collection is read-only, worked from exports rather than by logging into live devices. Your engineers are needed mainly at the scoping call and the evidence handover. If a diagram is out of date, say so then rather than fixing it first; the gap is itself a finding.

Which firewall and edge platforms do you cover, and what happens with an unusual device?

We work across the common enterprise firewall, VPN and edge platforms, and we name no product here as a recommendation. The practical test is not the badge on the device but whether we can obtain a readable configuration export and whether the platform has a published hardening guide or CIS benchmark to measure it against. Where both exist the review runs the same way: parse the rule base, compare device settings to the baseline, then hand-review what the baseline does not cover. Where a device is unusual, end-of-life or has no published baseline, we say so during scoping and agree what it will be measured against instead, rather than quietly grading it on a guide written for something else. Cloud-native firewalls and security groups sit better in our Cloud Security Configuration Assessment, and host firewalls in the Operating System Hardening Review, so scoping often splits an estate across those engagements.

How risky is the cleanup, and how do we stage rule removals without breaking production?

Removing rules breaks things, which is why we sequence the cleanup rather than hand you a list. We do not touch your devices; your team applies changes through your own change process. What we provide is an order of work ranked from lowest to highest change risk, and the tightened rule wording for each change, so your engineer approves a specific edit rather than interpreting a recommendation. Low-risk items come first: shadowed rules that never evaluate, duplicates, and exposed management planes. Rules with no recorded hits come next, and those are best staged through a logging-only or deny-with-alert period on your side before deletion, because a quarterly job may be the only traffic that ever matched one. Broad any-any rules carrying real production traffic come last and usually need decomposing into narrower rules. Once your changes land we re-review the configuration and rescan the perimeter, and that re-check is part of the engagement.

How often should a perimeter review be repeated, and what should trigger one early?

Once a year for the full review, plus a shorter re-look whenever the perimeter changes shape. The argument for a yearly cycle is simply that rule bases grow and rarely shrink: twelve months of change requests, project exceptions and temporary openings that were never closed is enough to undo a cleanup. The events that should pull a review forward are structural rather than calendar-driven: a firewall replacement or migration, a new site or data centre joining the network, a merger that connects a second estate to yours, an internal service moved to the edge, or an audit that needs current evidence of perimeter control. Between reviews the cheapest discipline is your own: require a named business owner and an expiry date on each new rule, and revisit zero-hit rules quarterly. The re-check after remediation is already included here, so the first cycle is covered by this engagement.