Secure Code Review (SCR) Services

We review JavaScript and TypeScript, Python, Java, Kotlin, Go, PHP, C# and Swift, and the frameworks normally built on them. Language matters less here than you might expect. The flaws we hunt are access decisions taken in the wrong place, trust placed in a value the user controls, session and token handling that does not hold, and business logic that can be driven into a state nobody designed for. Those read much the same in Go as in PHP; what changes is where a framework hides them, which is why the first phase walks your architecture and trust boundaries with your engineers and agrees which authentication, payment and data-handling paths we read first. Where a stack mixes several of them, we watch the shared paths where they meet, because that boundary is where one service assumes the other already validated something. If your codebase sits outside that set, say so on the scoping call and we will tell you plainly whether we can review it.

You need both, because they do different jobs. SAST is good at volume and poor at judgement: it covers ground quickly, spots repeated patterns and points at places worth looking, but it returns possibilities rather than proof, and the list arrives with no sense of which entries matter. Manual review supplies the judgement. Our engineers read the selected paths line by line, follow data and control flow, and check each access decision against the role model the application is supposed to enforce. That is how flaws in logic, authorisation and trust surface, because they are correct-looking code doing the wrong thing. On this engagement the two are sequenced rather than run together: we tune and triage the scanner output first, cluster repeated alerts into single root causes, then read by hand. Each finding is confirmed reachable and exploitable before it is written down, so what reaches you is proven rather than suspected.

Read access to the source, a pinned branch or commit, and enough to build and run the application. Manual review cannot be done from a description, and exploitability is confirmed on a working build rather than argued on paper, so build and environment instructions matter as much as the code. Pinning the revision matters too: if the branch moves mid-engagement, findings start referring to lines that have already changed, and the closing re-review loses its baseline. What we do not need is your production data. A local build with representative test accounts is enough, and it keeps real personal data out of the engagement entirely, which is the right answer under the DPDP Act as well as the practical one. If you would rather we worked inside your environment and your access controls, we do, and we stay on the paths agreed in the first phase rather than wandering the codebase. Whatever route you choose, everything is handed back when the engagement ends.

Findings arrive with file and line references and a fix written as a code diff, not as a description. The report is built for the people who have to close it. Each confirmed issue carries its location in the source, a minimal proof of concept showing the path is reachable, a rank based on business impact rather than scanner severity, and a suggested regression test so the fix stays fixed. We also pair with your engineers, walk them through the patterns behind the individual findings, and answer what a report cannot. An executive summary sits on top for the people who need risk tied to your critical paths rather than to line numbers. The phases run in order, so that session follows the manual review and the exploitability work rather than running beside them. Once your fixes land we re-review the changed code, retest each proof of concept on the patched build, and close each finding with a verified status.

Review the code when you want to know why a flaw exists; test the running application when you want to know what an attacker can reach. They find different things. A review sees what is hard to reach from outside: dead authorisation checks, secrets committed to source, and logic that only misbehaves in a state you could not easily drive from a browser. A penetration test sees deployed reality, the configuration, the environment, the version actually running, and the chains that exist only once the parts are assembled. Neither substitutes for the other, and a clean review does not promise a clean deployment. If you must choose one, let the reason decide. An auditor or a customer questionnaire usually wants the running application tested, which is what our VAPT practice covers. A rewrite of your payment or authentication code is the moment for a review, and we will say which on the scoping call.